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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in DNA sequencing technologies have put
ubiquitous availability of fully sequenced human genomes
within reach. It is no longer hard to imagine the day when
everyone will have the means to obtain and store one’s own
DNA sequence. Widespread and affordable availability of
fully sequenced genomes immediately opens up important
opportunities in a number of health-related fields. In par-
ticular, common genomic applications and tests performed
in vitro today will soon be conducted computationally, us-
ing digitized genomes. New applications will be developed
as genome-enabled medicine becomes increasingly preven-
tive and personalized. However, this progress also prompts
significant privacy challenges associated with potential loss,
theft, or misuse of genomic data. In this paper, we begin
to address genomic privacy by focusing on three important
applications: Paternity Tests, Personalized Medicine, and
Genetic Compatibility Tests. After carefully analyzing these
applications and their privacy requirements, we propose a
set of efficient techniques based on private set operations.
This allows us to implement in in silico some operations
that are currently performed via in vitro methods, in a se-
cure fashion. Experimental results demonstrate that pro-
posed techniques are both feasible and practical today.
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past four decades, DNA sequencing has been
one of the major driving forces in life-sciences, producing
full genome sequences of thousands of viruses and bacteria,
and dozens of eukaryotic organisms, from yeast to man (e.g.,
[32, 2, 81, 43]). This trend is only being accentuated by
modern High-Throughput Sequencing (HTS) technologies:
the first diploid human genome sequences were recently pro-
duced [55, 83, 78] and a project to sequence 1,000 human ge-
nomes has been essentially completed [46, 70, 21]. Different
HTS technologies are competing to sequence an individual
human genome — composed of about 3 billion DNA nucle-
otides (or bases) — for less than $1,000 by 2012 [69], and
even less than $100 five years later, reaching the point where
human genome sequencing will be a commodity costing less
than an X-ray or an MRI scan. Ubiquity of human and other
genomes creates enormous opportunities and challenges. In
particular, it promises to address one of the greatest societal
∗
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challenges of our time: the unsustainable rise of health care
costs, by ushering a new era of genome-enabled predictive,
preventive, participatory, and personalized medicine (“P4”
medicine). In time, genomes could become part of the Elec-
tronic Medical Record of every individual [40].
However, widespread availability of HTS technologies and
genomic data exacerbates ethical, security, and privacy con-
cerns [12]. A full genome sequence not only uniquely iden-
tifies each one of us; it also contains information about,
for instance, our ethnic heritage, disease predispositions,
and many other phenotypic traits [25, 68]. Traditional ap-
proaches to privacy, such as de-identification or aggrega-
tion [57, 41], become completely moot in the genomic era,
since the genome itself is the ultimate identifier. To further
compound the privacy problem, health information is in-
creasingly shared electronically among insurance companies,
health care providers and employers. This, coupled with the
possibility of creating large centralized genome repositories,
raises the specter of possible abuses.
Some federal laws have been passed to begin address-
ing privacy issues. The 2003 Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) provides a general frame-
work for protecting and sharing Protected Health Informa-
tion (PHI) [22, 52, 58]. In 2008, the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) was adopted to prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of genetic information. with respect
to health insurance and employment [77]. While providing
general guidelines and a basic safety net, current legislation
does not offer detailed technical information about safe and
privacy-preserving ways for storing and querying genomes.
In short, technical issues of security and privacy for HTS and
genomic data remain both important and relatively poorly
understood.
While privacy issues are not yet hampering progress in
basic genomic research, it is not too early to start investi-
gating them, particularly, in light of their complexity, po-
tential impact on society, and current efforts to reform the
health care system. It remains unclear where personal ge-
nomic information will be stored, who will have access to it,
and how it will be queried and shared. To remain flexible,
we can imagine a general framework comprised of two kinds
of basic entities: (1) Data Centers where genomic data is
stored, and (2) Agents/Agencies interested in querying this
data. Granularity of Data Centers could vary. At one end
of the spectrum, every individual could be her own Data
Center and store the genome on a personal computer, cell
phone, or some other device. At the other extreme, we could
envision national or even international Data Centers storing
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millions (or even billions) of genomic sequences. Data Cen-
ters could also be envisioned at the granularity of family,
school, pharmacy, laboratory, hospital, city, county or state.
Likewise, many different types of Agents/Agencies are con-
ceivable, ranging from individuals and personal physicians,
to family members, pharmacies, hospitals, insurance compa-
nies, employers and government agencies (e.g., the FBI), or
international organizations. Various Agents/Agencies might
be allowed to query different aspects of genomic data and
might be required to satisfy different query privacy require-
ments. In addition, one could imagine cases (e.g., criminal
search or proprietary diagnostic technology) where both the
genomic data and queries against it must remain private.
The main security and privacy challenge is how to support
such queries with low storage costs and reasonably short
query times, while satisfying privacy and security require-
ments associated with a given type of transaction. Unfortu-
nately, current methods for privacy-preserving data query-
ing do not scale to genomic data sizes. Several cryptographic
techniques have been proposed that — though not address-
ing the case of fully-sequenced genomes — focus on private
computation over genomic fragments. Specifically, they al-
low two or more parties to engage in protocols that reveal
only the end-result of a given computation on their respec-
tive genomic data, without leaking any additional informa-
tion. The main thrust of this paper is to adapt and deploy ef-
ficient cryptographic techniques to address specific genomic
queries and applications, described below.
1.1 Applications
As mentioned above, availability of affordable full genome
sequencing makes it increasingly possible to query and test
genomic information not only in vitro, but also in silico us-
ing computational techniques. We consider three concrete
examples of such tests and corresponding privacy-relevant
scenarios.
Paternity Tests establish whether a male individual is the
biological father of another individual, using genetic finger-
printing. Advances in biotechnology facilitated DNA pater-
nity tests and stimulated the creation of hundreds of online
companies offering testing via self-administered cheek swabs
for as little as $79 (e.g., http://www.gtldna.net). However,
this practice raises several security and privacy concerns: the
testing company must be trusted with privacy and accuracy
of test results, as well as with swabs that might yield full
genome sequencing. We believe that, ideally, any two in-
dividuals, in possession of their genomes should be able to
conduct a privacy-preserving paternity test with no involve-
ment of any third parties. Only the outcome of the test
ought to be learned by one or both parties and no other
sensitive genomic information should be disclosed.
Personalized Medicine is recognized as a significant
paradigm shift and a major trend in health care, moving
us closer to a more precise, powerful, and holistic type of
medicine [82]. With personalize medicine, treatment and
medication type/dosage would be tailored to the precise ge-
netic makeup of individual patient. For example, measure-
ments of erbB2 protein in breast, lung, or colorectal can-
cer patients are taken before selecting proper treatment.
It has been showed that the trastuzumab monoclonal an-
tibody is effective only in patients whose genetic receptor
is over-expressed [67]. Furthermore, the FDA has recently
recommended testing for the thiopurine S-methyltransferase
(tpmt) gene, prior to prescribing for 6-mercaptopurine and
azathioprine — two drugs used for treating childhood
leukemia and autoimmune diseases. The tpmt gene codes
for the TPMT enzyme that metabolizes thiopurine drugs:
genetic polymorphisms affecting enzymatic activity are cor-
related with variations in sensitivity and toxicity response
to such drugs. Patients suffering from this genetic disease
(1 in 300) only need 6-10% of the standard dose of thiop-
urine drugs; if treated with the full dose, they risk severe
bone marrow suppression and subsequent death [1]. Not
surprisingly, experts predict that availability of full genome
sequencing will further stimulate development of personal-
ized medicine [31].
Genetic Tests are routinely used for several purposes, such
as newborn screening, confirmational diagnostics, as well as
pre-symptomatic testing, e.g., predicting Huntington’s dis-
ease [36] and estimating risks of various types of cancer. We
focus on genetic compatibility tests, whereby potential or ex-
isting partners wish to assess the possibility of transmitting
to their children a genetic disease with Mendelian inheri-
tance [59]. Modern genetic testing can accurately predict
whether a couple is at risk of conceiving a child with an
autosomal recessive disease. Consider, for instance, Beta-
Thalassemia minor, that causes red cells to be smaller than
average, due to a mutation in the hbb gene. It is called
minor when the mutation occurs only in one allele. This
minor form has no severe impact on a subject’s quality of
life. However, the major variant — that occurs when both
alleles carry the mutation — is likely to result in premature
death, usually, before age twenty. Therefore, if both part-
ners silently carry the minor form, there is a 25% chance
that their child could carry the major variety. Another ex-
ample is the Lynch Syndrome (also known as Hereditary
Nonpolyposis Colon Cancer), a genetic condition — most
commonly inherited from a parent — associated with the
high risk of colon cancer [48]. Parents with this syndrome
have a 50% chance of passing it on to their children. Since
the possibility of inheritance is maximized if both parents
carry the mutations, testing for Lynch Syndrome is crucial.
Note on Non-human Genomes: Although this paper
focuses on human genomes, some aforementioned scenar-
ios apply to other organisms, e.g., crops and animals [3].
For instance, a paternity test may certify a purebred dog’s
bloodline or genetic tests may determine the quality of a
racing horse. In fact, DNA “barcodes” identifiers are al-
ready embedded in genomes of genetically modified species.
Conceivably, future veterinary treatments may also involve
elements of personalized medicine for animals.
1.2 Roadmap
Motivated by the emerging affordability of full genome
sequencing, we combine domain knowledge in biology, ge-
nomics, bioinformatics, security, privacy and applied cryp-
tography in order to better understand the corresponding
security and privacy challenges. In particular, we analyze
specific requirements of three types of applications discussed
above: Paternity Tests, Personalized Medicine and Genetic
Tests. In the process, we carefully consider today’s in vitro
procedure for each application and analyze its security and
privacy requirements in the digital domain. This type of
approach allows us to gradually craft specialized protocols
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that incur appreciably lower overhead than state-of-the-art.
However, as is well known, “lower overhead” does not nec-
essarily imply practicality. Therefore, we demonstrate —
via experiments on commodity hardware — that proposed
protocols are indeed viable and practical today. Source code
of our implementations is publicly available. We hope that
it can help in developing privacy-aware operations on full
genomes and allows individuals (in possession of their se-
quenced genomes) to run genetic tests with privacy.
Organization. We overview related work in the next sec-
tion. Then, Sec. 3 introduces biological and cryptographic
background used throughout the rest of the paper. The
core of the paper is in Sec. 4 that includes step-by-step de-
sign of protocols for each aforementioned application. It also
presents experimental results. Next, Sec. 5 provides security
arguments for proposed protocols, followed by the summary
and the discussion of future work in Sec. 6.
2. RELATED WORK
As discussed in Section 1, traditional approaches to pri-
vacy, such as de-identification, are often ineffective on ge-
nomic data, since the genome itself is the ultimate identi-
fier. We refer to [57, 41, 79, 86] for details on privacy risks
associated to releasing genomic information, even when ag-
gregated. Motivated by the sensitivity of genomic informa-
tion, the security research community has begun to develop
mechanisms to enable secure computation on genomic data.
A number of cryptographic protocols have been proposed
for private searching, matching and evaluating similarity of
strings, including DNA sequences. Also, prior work has
considered specific (privacy-preserving) genomic operations.
This section overviews relevant prior results and highlights
their potential limitation.
Searching and Matching DNA
Troncoso-Pastoriza, et al. [75] proposed an error-resilient
privacy-preserving protocol for string searching. In it, one
party (e.g., Alice), with her own DNA snippet, can verify
the existence of a short template (e.g., a genetic test held by
a service provider – Bob) within her snippet. This technique
handles errors and maintains privacy of both the template
and the snippet. Each query is represented as an automaton
executed using a finite state machine (FSM) in an oblivious
manner. Communication complexity is O(n · (|Σ| + |Q|)),
where n is snippet length, |Σ| – alphabet size (i.e., 4 for
DNA), and |Q| – number of states. Computational complex-
ity is O(n·|Σ|·|Q|) andO(n·|Q|) cryptographic operations for
Alice and Bob, respectively. However, the number of FSM
states is always revealed to all parties. To obtain error-
resilient and approximate DNA matching, [75] also shows
how to construct an automaton that, given Alice’s string x,
accepts all strings with Levenshtein distance [54] at most d
from x.
Blanton and Aliasgari [4] improve on [75], reducing Al-
ice’s work by a factor of |Σ| and Bob’s — by a factor of
log(|Q|), incurring, however, a potentially increased com-
munication complexity (if the security parameter is smaller
than log(|Q|)). This work also introduces a protocol for
secure outsourcing of computation to an external service
provider and a modified multi-party protocol.
A set of cryptographic protocols for secure pattern match-
ing are presented in [29] and [38]. Given a binary string T of
length n, held by Alice, and a binary pattern p of length m,
held by Bob, pattern matching lets Bob learn all locations
in T where p appears. Secure computation guarantees that
nothing exceptm is learned by Alice, and nothing about T is
revealed to Bob (besides n and locations where p appears).
[29] proposes one such protocol, secure in the semi-honest
setting, based on homomorphic encryption, with O(m + n)
communication and computation complexities. It includes
another protocol, secure in the malicious setting, based on
secure oblivious automata evaluation, with quadratic com-
plexity and m rounds. Subsequently, [38] presented an im-
proved protocol, with malicious security, using homomor-
phic encryption and incurring O(m+ n) complexity.
Another related result is the recent work in [50]. It re-
alizes secure computation of the CODIS test [73] (run by
the FBI for DNA identity testing), that could not be im-
plemented using pattern matching or FSM. It achieves ef-
ficient secure computation of function M(T, p, e, l) = 1 iff
|lmax(T, p) − l| ≤ ε, where T is a DNA fragment, p a pat-
tern, (ε, l) some additional information, and lmax(T, p) ≥ 0
is the largest integer l′ for which pl
′
appears as a substring
in T . A general technique for secure text processing is intro-
duced, combining garbled circuits and secure pattern match-
ing. (The latter is reduced to private keyword search and
solved using Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRF-
s) [26, 37].) The resulting protocol can compute several
functions (including CODIS) on sample T and pattern p,
using the number of circuits linear in the number of occur-
rences of p. Complexity incurred by the underlying keyword
search protocol is linear in |T |. However, common knowl-
edge of some threshold on the number of occurrences needs
to be assumed.
Similarity of DNA Sequences
Another set of cryptographic results focus on privately
computing the edit distance of two strings α, β of size m and
n, respectively.1 Privacy-preserving computation of Smith-
Waterman scores [71] has also been investigated and used
for sequence alignment.
Jha, et al. [45] proposed techniques for secure edit distance
using garbled circuits [84], and showed that the overhead
is acceptable only for small strings (e.g., a 200-character
strings require 2GB circuits). For longer strings, two op-
timized techniques were proposed; they exploit the struc-
ture of the dynamic programming problem (intrinsic to the
specific circuit) and split the computation into smaller com-
ponent circuits. However, a quadratic number of oblivious
transfers is needed to evaluate garbled circuits, thus limit-
ing scalability of this approach. For example, 500-character
string instances take almost one hour to complete [45]. Op-
timized protocols also extend to privacy-preserving Smith-
Waterman scores [71], a more sophisticated string compar-
ison algorithm, where costs of delete/insert/replace oper-
ations, instead of being equal, are determined by special
functions. Again, scalability is limited: experiments in [45]
show that evaluation of Smith-Waterman for a 60-character
string takes about 1,000 seconds.
Somewhat less related techniques include [47] that pro-
posed a cryptographic framework for executing queries on
genomic databases where privacy is attained by relying on
1
Edit distance is the minimum number of operations (delete, insert,
or replace) needed to transform α into β.
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two anonymizing and non-colluding parties. Danezis, et
al. [16] used negative databases to test a single profile against
a database of suspects, such that database contents cannot
be efficiently enumerated.
Specialized Protocols
Wang, et al. [80] proposed techniques for computation on
genomic data stored at a data provider, including: edit dis-
tance, Smith-Waterman and search for homologous genes.
Program specialization is used to partition genomic data
into “public” (most of the genome) and “sensitive” (a very
small subset of the genome). Sensitive regions are replaced
with symbols by data providers (DPs) before data consumers
(DCs) have access to genomic information. DCs perform
concrete execution on public data and symbolic execution
on sensitive data, and may perform queries to DPs on sensi-
tive nucleotides. However, only queries that do not let DCs
reconstruct sensitive regions are allowed by DPs and generic
two-party computation techniques are used during query ex-
ecution. Portions of sensitive data are public information.
We note that, due to the current limited knowledge of hu-
man genome, parts that are considered non-sensitive today
may actually become sensitive later.
Also, Bruekers, et al. [7] presented privacy-preserving tech-
niques for a few DNA operations, such as: identity test,
common ancestor and paternity test, based on STR (Short
Tandem Repeat; see Sec. 3.1). Homomorphic encryption
is used on alleles (fragments of DNA) to compute compar-
isons. Testing protocols tolerate a small number of errors,
however, their complexity increases with the number of tol-
erated errors [4]. Also, [7] leaves as an open problem the
scenario where an attacker (honestly) runs the protocol but
executes it on arbitrarily chosen inputs. In this setting, at-
tackers, given STR’s limited entropy, can “lie” about their
STR profiles and run multiple dependent protocols thus re-
constructing the other party’s profile.
Using Current Techniques?
We aim to obtain secure and private computation on fully
sequenced genomes, in scenarios where individuals possess
their own genomic data. As discussed in Sec. 1, we focus on
paternity testing, personalized medicine and genetic com-
patibility testing. Prior work has yielded a number of ele-
gant (if not always efficient) cryptographic protocols for se-
cure computation on DNA sequences. However, we identify
some notable open problems:
1. Efficiency: Most current protocols are designed for
DNA snippets (e.g., hundreds of thousands nucleo-
tides) and it is unclear how to scale them to full ge-
nomes (i.e., three billion nucleotides).
2. Error Resilience: Most prior work attempts to
achieve resilience to sequencing errors in computation
(e.g., using approximate matching or distance with
errors). Not surprisingly, this results in: (i) signif-
icant computation and communication overhead, and
(ii) ruling out more efficient and simpler cryptographic
tools, i.e., those geared for exact matching. (Whereas,
our goal is error-resilience by design.) Also, as the cost
of full genome sequencing drops, so do error rates. By
increasing the number of sequencing runs, the proba-
bility of sequencing errors can be rapidly reduced.
3. Inter-String Distance: Analyzing the distance be-
tween sequenced strings works for the creation of phy-
logenetic trees, parental analysis, and homology stud-
ies. However, it does not suit applications, such as
genetic diseases testing, that require much more com-
plex comparisons.
4. Paternity Testing: To the best of our knowledge, the
only available technique for privacy-preserving genetic
paternity testing is [7]. However, it does not prevent a
participant from manipulating its input to reconstruct
the counterpart’s profile. Also, as shown in Sec. 4.1,
overhead can be significantly reduced using techniques
that obtain error resilience by design.
5. Genetic Testing via Pattern Matching: The use
of pattern matching over full genomes to test for ge-
netic compatibility and/or personalized medicine is not
straightforward. Suppose that a party wants to pri-
vately search for certain gene mutation, e.g., Beta-
Thalassemia. The pattern representing this mutation
might be very short — a few nucleotides — but needs
to be searched in the full genome, as restricting the
search to the specific gene would trivially expose the
nature of the test. Therefore, na¨ıve application of pat-
tern matching would return all locations (presumably
millions) where the pattern appears. This would be
detrimental to both privacy and efficiency of the re-
sulting solution. We could modify the pattern to in-
clude nucleotides expected to appear immediately be-
fore/after the mutation, such that, with high probabil-
ity, this pattern would appear at most once. However,
this needs to be done carefully, since: (i) nucleotides
added to the pattern must appear in all human ge-
nomes, and (ii) the choice of pattern length should not
expose the mutation being searched. Plus, extending
the pattern would also increase computation and com-
munication overhead.
3. PRELIMINARIES
This section provides some relevant biology and cryptog-
raphy background information.
3.1 Biology Background
Genomes represent the entirety of an organism’s hereditary
information. They are encoded either in DNA or, for many
types of viruses, in RNA. The genome includes both the
genes and the non-coding sequences of the DNA/RNA. For
humans and many other organisms, the genome is encoded
in double stranded deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) molecules,
consisting of two long and complementary polymer chains
of four simple units called nucleotides, represented by the
letters A, C, G, and T. The human genome consists of ap-
proximately 3 billion letters.
Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms (RFLPs)
refers to a difference between samples of homologous DNA
molecules that come from differing locations of restriction
enzyme sites, and to a related laboratory technique by which
these segments can be illustrated. In RFLP analysis, a
DNA sample is broken into pieces (digested) by restriction
enzymes and the resulting restriction fragments are sepa-
rated according to their lengths by gel electrophoresis. Thus,
RFLP provides information about the length (but not the
composition) of DNA subsequences occurring between known
subsequences recognized by particular enzymes. Although
it is being progressively superseded by inexpensive DNA se-
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quencing technologies, RFLP analysis was the first DNA
profiling technique inexpensive enough for widespread appli-
cation. It is still widely used at present. RFLP probes are
frequently used in genome mapping and in variation anal-
ysis, such genotyping, forensics, paternity tests and heredi-
tary disease diagnostics. (For more details, see [64].)
Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs) are the most
common form of DNA variation occurring when a single nu-
cleotide (A, C, G, or T) differs between members of the
same species or paired chromosomes of an individual [72].
The average SNP frequency in the human genome is ap-
proximately 1 per 1,000 nucleotide pairs.2 SNP variations
are often associated with how individuals develop diseases
and respond to pathogens, chemicals, drugs, vaccines, and
other agents. Thus SNPs are key enablers in realizing per-
sonalized medicine [10]. Moreover, they are used in genetic
disease and disorder testing, as well as to compare genome
regions between cohorts in genome-wide association studies.
Short Tandem Repeats (STRs) occur when a pattern
of two or more nucleotides are repeated and repeated se-
quences are directly adjacent to each other. The pattern
can range in length from 2 to 50 nucleotides or so. Unre-
lated people likely have different numbers of repeat units in
highly polymorphic regions, hence, STRs are often used to
differentiate between individuals. STR loci (i.e., locations on
a chromosome) are targeted with sequence-specific primers.
Resulting DNA fragments are then separated and detected
using electrophoresis. By identifying repeats of a specific
sequence at specific locations in the genome, it is possible to
create a genetic profile of an individual. There are currently
over 10,000 published STR sequences in the human genome.
3.2 Cryptography Background
We now overview a set of cryptographic concepts and tools
used in the rest of the paper. For ease of exposition, we omit
basic notions and refer to [34, 49, 60] for details on various
cryptographic primitives, such as hash functions, number-
theoretic assumptions, as well as encryption and signature
schemes.
Private Set Intersection (PSI) [27]: a protocol between
Server with input S = {s1, . . . , sw}, and Client with input
C={c1, . . . , cv}. At the end, Client learns S∩C. PSI securely
implements: FPSI : (S ,C) 7→ (⊥,S ∩ C).
Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA) [27]:
a protocol between Server with input S = {s1, . . . , sw}, and
Client with input C= {c1, . . . , cv}. At the end, Client learns
|S ∩C|. PSI-CA securely implements: FPSI-CA : (S ,C) 7→ (⊥,
|S ∩ C|).
Authorized Private Set Intersection (APSI) [18]: a
protocol between Server with input S = {s1, . . . , sw}, and
Client with input C={c1, . . . , cv} and Cσ={σ1, . . . , σv}. At
the end, Client learns:
ASI
def
= S ∩ {ci | ci ∈ C ∧ σi valid auth. on ci}.
APSI securely implements: FAPSI : (S , (C, Cσ)) 7→ (⊥,ASI).
Additively Homomorphic Encryption. Let (K;Enc;Dec)
be a homomorphic encryption scheme, where K is the key
generator algorithm selecting public/secret key-pair (pk, sk).
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NCBI maintains an interactive collection of SNPs, dbSNP, contain-
ing all known genetic variations of the human genome [62].
Assume that the message space for a public key pk is Zp for
some integer p, then Enc(m) denotes encryption under key
pk, andDec(c) denotes decryption under key sk. The follow-
ing additive homomorphic properties hold: (1) the product
of two ciphertexts is a ciphertext for the sum of the plain-
texts, i.e., for any a, b ∈ Zp, we haveDec(Enc(a) ·Enc(b)) =
a+ b, and (2) raising a ciphertext for a message a to power
r gives a ciphertext r · a, i.e., for any r ∈ Zp, we have
Dec(Enc(a)r) = r · a.
Adversarial Model. We use standard security models for
secure two-party computation. One distinguishing factor is
the adversarial model that is either semi-honest or malicious.
(In the rest of this paper, the term adversary refers to insid-
ers, i.e., protocol participants. Outside adversaries are not
considered, since their actions can be mitigated via standard
network security techniques.)
Following definitions in [34], protocols secure in the pres-
ence of semi-honest adversaries assume that parties faith-
fully follow all protocol specifications and do not misrepre-
sent any information related to their inputs, e.g., size and
content. However, during or after protocol execution, any
party might (passively) attempt to infer additional infor-
mation about the other party’s input. This model is formal-
ized by considering an ideal implementation where a trusted
third party (TTP) receives the inputs of both parties and
outputs the result of the defined function. Security in the
presence of semi-honest adversaries requires that, in the real
implementation of the protocol (without a TTP), each party
does not learn more information than in the ideal implemen-
tation.
Security in the presence of malicious parties allows arbi-
trary deviations from the protocol. However, it does not
prevent parties from refusing to participate in the protocol,
modifying their inputs, or prematurely aborting the proto-
col. Security in the malicious model is achieved if the ad-
versary (interacting in the real protocol, without the TTP)
can learn no more information than it could in the ideal sce-
nario. In other words, a secure protocol emulates (in its real
execution) the ideal execution that includes a TTP. This no-
tion is formulated by requiring the existence of adversaries
in the ideal execution model that can simulate adversarial
behavior in the real execution model.
Although security arguments in this paper are made with
respect to semi-honest participants, extensions to malicious
participant security (with the same computation and com-
munication complexities) have already been developed for
our cryptographic building blocks: PSI, PSI-CA and APSI.
We consider these extensions to be out of the scope of this
paper.
4. GENOME TESTING
We now explore efficient techniques for privacy-preserving
testing on fully sequenced genomes. Unlike most prior work
(reviewed in Sec. 2), we do not seek generic solutions for
genomic computation. Instead, we focus on a few specific
real-world applications and, for each, capitalize on domain
knowledge to propose an efficient privacy-preserving approach.
Notation. We assume that each participant has a dig-
ital copy of her fully sequenced genome denoted by G =
{(b1||1), . . . , (bn||n)}, where bi ∈ {A, G, C, T, –}, n is the
human genome length (i.e., 3 · 109), and “||” denotes con-
catenation. The “–” symbol is needed to handle DNA mu-
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Client, on input C = {c1, . . . , cv} [Common Input: (p, q, g,H,H′)] Server, on input S = {s1, . . . , sw}
Offline
{sˆ1, . . . , sˆw} ← Π(S), with Π
random permutation
Rs ← Zq, R′s ← Zq , Y = gRs
∀j 1 ≤ j ≤ w, ksj = H(sˆj)R′s
Offline
Rc ← Zq , R′c ← Zq , X = gRc X, {a1, . . . , av} Online
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, ai = H(ci)R
′
c // ∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, a′i = (ai)R
′
s
(a′ℓ1
, . . . , a′ℓv ) = Π(a
′
1, . . . , a
′
v)
∀j 1 ≤ j ≤ w, tsj = H′(XRs· ksj)
Online
{ts1, . . . , tsw}
Y, {a′ℓ1 , . . . , a
′
ℓv
}
oo
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, tcℓi = H′((Y Rc)(a′ℓi )
1/R′
c )
Out:
∣∣{ts1, . . . , tsw} ∩ {tcℓ1 , . . . , tcℓv}
∣∣
Figure 1: PSI-CA protocol from [19]. It executes on common input of two primes p and q (such that q|p− 1),
a generator g of a subgroup of size q and two hash functions, H and H′, modeled as random oracles. All
computation is mod p.
tations corresponding to deletion, i.e., where a portion of
a chromosome is missing [56]. It is also used when the se-
quencing process fails to determine a nucleotide. This data
may be pre-processed in order to speed up execution of spe-
cific applications. For example, parties may pre-compute a
cryptographic hash, H(·), on each nucleotide, alongside its
position in the genome, i.e., for each (bi||i) ∈ G, they com-
pute hbi=H(bi||i).3
We use the notation |str| to denote the length of string
str, and |A| to denote the cardinality of set A. Finally, we
use r ← R to indicate that r is chosen uniformly at random
from set R.
Experimental Setup. The rest of this section includes
some experimental results. Unless explicitly stated other-
wise, all experiments were performed on a Linux Desktop,
with an Intel Core i5-560M (running at 2.66 GHz). All
tests were run on a single processor core and all code is
written in C, using OpenSSL and GMP libraries. Crypto-
graphic protocols use the SHA-1 hash function and 1024-
bit moduli. Source code of our experiments is available at
http://sprout.ics.uci.edu/projects/privacy-dna.
4.1 Genetic Paternity Test
A Genetic Paternity Test (GPT) allows two individuals
with their respective genomes to determine whether there
exists a biological parent-child relationship between them. A
Privacy-Preserving Genetic Paternity Test (PPGPT)
achieves the same result without revealing any information
about the two genomes. In the following, we refer to the
two participants as Client and Server. Only Client receives
the outcome of the test.
4.1.1 Strawman Approach
Genomics studies have shown that about 99.5% of any two
human genomes are identical. Humans carry two copies of
each chromosome, inherited one from the mother and one
from the father. Thus, genomes carried by two individu-
3
In case of insertion mutation in the genome, e.g., an ‘A’ is added
between positions 35 and 36, genome pre-processing computes
H(A||35||1). Similarly, if insertion involves multiple nucleotides.
Since insertions are rare in human genomes, we do not consider them
in this paper.
als tied by a parent-child relationship show an even higher
degree of similarity. As a result, one immediate compu-
tational technique for GPT is to compare the candidate’s
genome with that of the child; the test returns a positive
result if the percentage of matching nucleotides is above a
given threshold τ , i.e., significantly higher than 99.5%.
First-Attempt Protocol. At first glance, protecting pri-
vacy is relatively easy: recent proposals for Private Set Inter-
section Cardinality (PSI-CA) protocols [27, 76, 51, 19] offer
efficient and private two-party computation of the number
of set elements shared by two parties. Thus, to perform
PPGPT, two participants just need to run PSI-CA on input
of their respective genomes.
We select the PSI-CA construction from [19] (shown in
Fig. 1) since it offers the best communication and compu-
tation complexities. Also, we use PSI-CA rather than PSI
since semi-honest participants only need to learn how simi-
lar their genomes are. Whereas, PSI would also reveal where
the two genomes differ and/or where they have common fea-
tures.
We emphasize that this approach provides very accurate
results, and is not significantly affected by potential sequenc-
ing errors. In fact, given expected error ratio ε, one can
simply modify threshold τ to accommodate errors. This is
because ε is expected to be significantly smaller than the
difference between τ and the percentage of nucleotides that
any two individuals share.
Unfortunately, since the number of nucleotides in the hu-
man genome is extremely large (about 3 · 109), this tech-
nique, though optimal in terms of accuracy, is impractical
using current commodity hardware, as it requires both par-
ties to perform online computation over the entire genome.
Specifically, PSI-CA entails a number of (short) modular
exponentiations linear in the input size. Table 1 estimates
execution times and bandwidth incurred by this na¨ıve ap-
proach. Since Client’s online computation depends on that
of the Server, a single test would consume approximately 10
days.
Improved Protocol. Since about 99.5% of the human ge-
nome is the same, two parties would only need to compare
the remaining 0.5%. Unfortunately, there is yet not enough
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Offline Online
Time Time Size
Client 4.5 days 4.5 days 358 GB
Server 4.5 days 4.5 days 414 GB
Table 1: Computation and communication costs of
the first straw-man PPGPT protocol.
statistical knowledge to pinpoint where exactly this 0.5% oc-
curs. Nonetheless, experts claim that, in practice, compar-
ing a properly chosen 1% of the genome yields an accuracy
comparable to analyzing the entire genome [30]. Running
times and bandwidth overhead required by this improved
method are presented in Table 2.
Offline Online
Time Time Size
Client 67 mins 67 mins 3.57 GB
Server 67 mins 67 mins 4.14 GB
Table 2: Computation and communication costs of
improved PPGPT protocol. Computation is per-
formed over 1% of the human genome.
4.1.2 Efficient RFLP-based PPGPT with PSI-CA
We now present a very efficient technique for Privacy-
Preserving Genetic Paternity Testing (PPGPT). To con-
struct it, we take advantage of domain knowledge in ge-
nomics and build upon effective in vitro techniques (RFLP or
SNP) rather than generic computational techniques. First,
we design a protocol that implements RFLP-based GPT.
Next, we propose a cryptographic technique for secure com-
putation of this protocol that realizes PPGPT. Finally, we
show that the technique used for computing RFLP-based
GPT can be easily adapted to perform SNP-based GPT.
As discussed in Sec. 3.1, RFLPs use specific restriction
enzymes (e.g., HaeIII, PstI, and HinfI), to digest a genome
into hundreds of smaller fragments. Following the deter-
ministic and well-known process, enzymes cut the DNA at
each occurrence of a given pattern (e.g., “CTGCAG”with PstI).
Next, a subset of these fragments is selected using a small
number of probes for well-known markers, which are located
in known areas of the genome. In an RFLP-based pater-
nity test, this process is applied to the DNA of the two
tested individuals. If resulting fragments have comparable
lengths, then the test returns a positive with certain confi-
dence, based on the exact number of fragments of the same
length.
There are a few slightly different ways to select the type
and the number of markers, thus identifying exactly which
fragments to compare. For the sake of reliability, one needs
to use markers that are rare enough (i.e., occur in unre-
lated individuals with very low probability) while common
enough to occur in at least one of the tested subjects. Cur-
rently, public databases and scientific literature offer thou-
sands available probes for RFLP in human genomes [11, 65,
74]. However, to reduce the cost of in vitro tests, only a
small subset of them is actually used [20]. Different labora-
tories consider various accuracy/cost trade-offs. Some com-
pare as few as 9-15 DNA markers, returning a positive result
whenever fewer than two fragments do not match [13], with
an estimated 99.9% accuracy. Meanwhile, others use up to
25 markers and return a positive whenever fewer than two
fragments do not match, thus providing significantly higher
accuracy, i.e., about 99.999% [24, 53].
In the United States, these testing methodologies follow
precise regulations issued by the American Association of
Blood Banks (AABB) and are considered legally admissible
as evidence in the court of law. Since our PPGPT technique
closely mimics the in vitro procedure, it achieves the same
level of accuracy. Nevertheless, as the cost of RFLP emu-
lation on digitalized genomes is not significantly affected by
the number of selected markers, we can anticipate increas-
ing the number of markers to improve accuracy. We could
perform tests with 50 markers and show that this only adds
a small cost. However, selection of additional markers is out
of the scope of this paper, as their introduction does not
change the algorithm’s functionality presented below.
RFLP-based Protocol. This protocol involves two indi-
viduals, on private input of their respective fully sequenced
genomes. We distinguish between Client and Server, to de-
note the fact that only the former learns the test outcome.
The protocol is run on common input of: a threshold τ ,
a set of enzymes E = {e1, . . . , ej}, and a set of markers
M = {mk1, . . . ,mkl}. Each participant also inputs its digi-
tized genome.
1. First, participants emulate the digestion process of
each enzyme ei ∈ E on their genome. Consider, for
instance, the PstI enzyme: whenever the string CTGCAG
occurs, the enzyme cuts the genome in two fragments,
so that the first ends with CTGCA and the second starts
with G. As a result, genomes are digested into a large
number of fragments of variable length.
2. Next, participants probe the fragments using markers
in M . During this process, each participant selects up
to l fragments {frag1, . . . , fragl} (e.g., l = 25), cor-
responding to M . All remaining fragments are dis-
carded. Public markers are chosen such that each ap-
pears in at most one sequence.
3. Client builds the set FC = {(|frag(c)i |, mki)}li=1. For
each marker i not corresponding to any fragment, frag
(c)
i
is replaced with the empty string. Similarly, Server
builds FS={(|frag(s)i |, mki)}li=1
4. Client and Server run the PSI-CA protocol described
in Fig. 1, on respective inputs: FC and FS . Client
learns pt= |FC ∩FS|, i.e., how many of its and Server’s
fragments are of the same size.
5. Client learns the test result by comparing pt to thresh-
old τ .
Why Compare Lengths? It might seem that compar-
ing string lengths is unreliable since two same-length strings
might encode completely different content, while our pro-
tocol would consider these strings as matching. In practice,
however, this well-established technique yields false positives
with extremely low probability. Sequences are selected
using markers, i.e., according to (part of) their content.
Selection of markers, in turn, guarantees that they appear
only in one specific position in the entire genome. Edges of
each fragment are content-dependent as well, since enzymes
digest them according to a specific pattern of nucleotides.
Therefore, two unrelated sequences of the same length would
not be compared and two same-length sequences containing
the same marker should be indeed considered matching.
Furthermore, this approach boosts the resilience of PPGPT
against sequencing errors. Only errors occurring in the pat-
7
tern digested by enzymes (or in the markers) influence the
result of the RFLP-based PPGPT. However, since patterns
and markers are relatively short compared to the size of
the genome, this happens with very low probability, since
sampling errors are uniformly distributed. However, if we
let participants compare hashes of fragments, rather than
their length, even a moderate error rate would severely in-
crease the probability of false negatives, since even a single
sequencing error would affect the final outcome of the test.
Moreover, the main purpose of the PPGPT presented in this
paper is not to improve accuracy of the in vitro test currently
used, but to efficiently and securely replicate it in silico.
PSI-CA or PSI? The use of PSI-CA, rather than PSI,
is needed to minimize information learned by Client from
protocol execution. With PSI, if the number of matches is
sufficiently high (even if the test is negative), Client would
learn the lengths of several Server’s fragments: it could then
use this information to perform a paternity test between the
party previously playing the role of Server and any other
individual (although with slightly lower reliability).
SNP-based Protocol. SNP-based tests are replacing RFLP-
based tests due to their better performance [8]. While this
technique is not yet considered legally admissible in court, it
is expected to eventually supersede its RFLP-based counter-
part. Our RFLP-based protocol can be extended to perform
paternity testing using SNPs: instead of selecting fragments
using enzymes and markers, the SNP-based test selects frag-
ments using a set of known SNPs. Since the rest of the pro-
tocol is unchanged and the size of the set of SNPs is usually
52 elements [8], the new protocol performs almost identically
to the RFLP-based PPGPT protocol with 50 fragments.
Performance Evaluation. We now measure performance
of the RFLP-based protocol on the Intel Core i5-560M testbed.
The (offline) time needed to emulate the enzyme digestion
process on the full genome is 74 seconds. This computation
is performed only once, thus, it does not affect the time re-
quired to perform the interactive protocol. Finally, in order
to assess the practicality of the protocol on embedded de-
vices, we also measured its performance on a modern smart-
phone — a Nokia N900 equipped with ARM Cortex A8 CPU
running at 600 MHz. Table 3 summarizes the online cost of
the RFLP-based protocol, measuring computation and com-
munication overhead, using different numbers of markers, on
both i5-560M and A8 processors.
Entity Offline (Time) Online (Time/size)
(markers) i5-560M A8 i5-560M A8 Size
Client (25) 3.4 ms 323 ms 3.4 ms 323 ms 3 KB
Server (25) 3.4 ms 323 ms 3.4 ms 323 ms 3.5 KB
Client (50) 6.7 ms 645 ms 6.7 ms 645 ms 6 KB
Server (50) 6.7 ms 645 ms 6.7 ms 645 ms 7 KB
Table 3: Computation and communication costs of
RFLP-based PPGPT technique, testing 25 and 50
fragments.
For the sake of completeness, we compared our results
to prior work on privacy-preserving paternity testing, pre-
sented in Figure 3 of [7]. Following a conservative approach,
we instantiate: (i) the cheapest protocol variant, which tol-
erates no error, and (ii) the most efficient additively homo-
morphic cryptosystem among those suggested, i.e., modified
ElGamal [23]. Also, we only count the number of modular
exponentiations. Given that the paternity test is performed
over n alleles (with n ranging from 13 to 67 for increasing
accuracy) we estimate the following costs. In step (2) of the
protocol, the party obtaining the test result computes 8n
modified ElGamal encryptions, thus, incurring 24n (short)
modular exponentiations. In the i5-560M testbed, this takes
from 43ms to 224ms, depending on n. In step (3), the other
party needs to obtain the encrypted sum using homomorphic
properties: it does so by performing 30n exponentiations.
This takes between 54 and 262ms on the i5-560M testbed.
Even ignoring all other operations in [7] and without pre-
computation, our most accurate test (using 50 markers) is
about 5 times faster than the least accurate test in [7] (using
13 alleles).
4.1.3 PPGPT using Private Equality Testing
We now discuss another approach to PPGPT that uses
Private Equality Testing (PET) and homomorphic encryp-
tion.
Comparing Two Genomes. As mentioned in Section
4.1.1, about 99.5% of any two human genomes are identi-
cal. Therefore, the most natural way of performing pater-
nity test appears to be by determining how many nucleotides
are shared between them. We already outlined a mechanism
for privacy-preserving computation of such a test by repre-
senting a genome as a (unordered) set where each element
correspods to a position-numbered nucleotide and then us-
ing PSI-CA to obtain the number of matching nucleotides.
We now consider another technique. If we represent a ge-
nome as an ordered vector, then we can count the number
of matching nucleotides by testing pairwise equality of vec-
tor elements. In the privacy-preserving “world”, this prob-
lem can be solved using so-called Private Equality Testing
(PET).
Given a probabilistic additively homomorphic encryption
scheme, (K;Enc;Dec), such as modified ElGamal [23], Pail-
lier [66], or DGK [15], PET can be realized as follows. We
assume Client and Server, on input of two items c and s,
respectively, want to verify whether or not c = s:
1. Client generates (pk, sk) and sends Server Enc(c);
2. Server replies with (Enc(c) ·Enc(−s))r, for some ran-
dom r in the message space;
3. Client learns that c = s if Server’s answers decrypts to
zero, and nothing otherwise;
Note that “·” denotes the operation on two ciphertexts that
results in the ciphertext of the sum of their plaintexts, e.g.,
c and −s. Also, Enc(x)r is the operation on the ciphertext
that yields modular exponentiation with exponent r of the
corresponding plaintext x.
By extending this PET to n parallel executions (where n
is the the genome size in nucleotides), Client would learn how
many nucleotides they have in common. However, it would
also learn which ones are shared. To prevent the latter,
we modify the protocol as follows. Assuming that ci and si
represent the i-th nucleotide in Client’s and Server’s genomes,
respectively:
1. Client generates (pk, sk) and sends Server:
{Enc(c1), . . . , Enc(cn)}
2. Server replies with:
Π ({(Enc(c1) · Enc(−s1))r1 , . . . , (Enc(cn) ·Enc(−sn))rn})
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where Π(·) is a random permutation and r1, . . . , rn are
random in the message space.
3. Using Π(·), Client learns the number of ciphertexts that
decrypt to yield a zero and, yet, does not learn which
nucleotides match.
RFLP-based Paternity Test. We can also use PET to
obtain PPGPT based on RFLP. Recall from Section 4.1.2
that, after enzyme digestion and marker probing, Client and
Server obtain, respectively, {|frag(c)|i }li=1 and {|frag(s)i |}li=1.
Similar to the technique discussed above, they can compute
the number of fragments of the same length by using PET.
(Recall that a list of fragments is an ordered vector). The
resulting protocol is as follows:
1. Client generates (pk, sk) and sends Server:
{Enc(|frag(c)1 |), . . . , Enc(|frag(c)l |)}
2. Server replies with:
Π
(
{(Enc(|frag(c)1 |) · Enc(−|frag(s)1 |))r1 , . . . ,
. . . , (Enc(|frag(c)l |) ·Enc(−|frag(s)l |))rl}
)
where Π(·) is a random permutation and r1, . . . , rl are
random in the message space.
3. By decryption, Client learns the number of matching
fragment lengths (and nothing else) and determines
the test outcome.
4.2 Personalized Medicine
Personalized Medicine (PM) is increasingly used to pro-
vide patients with drugs designed for their specific genetic
features. As discussed in Sec. 1, in the context of PM, drugs
are associated with a unique genetic fingerprint. Their effec-
tiveness is maximized in patients with a matching DNA [39].
To this end, genomes need to be compared against the finger-
print and a patient need to surrender her DNA to a physician
or a pharmaceutical company.
One privacy-preserving approach is to let the patient in-
dependently run specialized software over her genome and
identify a match (or lack thereof) with a given drug’s finger-
print. This way, the patient would learn whether the drug is
appropriate. However, pharmaceuticals may consider DNA
fingerprints of their drugs to be trade secrets and thus might
be unwilling to reveal them. At the same time, for every new
drug, pharmaceuticals are required to obtain approval from
appropriate government entities, e.g., the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in case of the United States.
We now introduce a technique for Privacy-Preserving
Personalized Medicine Testing (P3MT), involving the
following steps:
• Following positive clinical trials, a pharmaceutical com-
pany obtains FDA approval on a specific DNA finger-
print fp and receives a corresponding authorization,
auth.
• The pharmaceutical and the patient engage in a proto-
col, where the former inputs (fp, auth) and the latter
inputs her genome.
• At the end of the protocol, the pharmaceutical learns
whether the patient’s genome matches fingerprint fp,
provided that auth is a valid authorization of fp.
Privacy requirements are that: (1) the company learns noth-
ing about patient genome besides the part matching the
(authorized) fingerprint, and (2) the patient learns nothing
about fp or auth.
4.2.1 P3MT Instantiation
We now present a specific P3MT instantiation. It involves:
(1) an authorization authority (e.g., the FDA) denoted as
CA, (2) a pharmaceutical — Client, and (3) a patient —
Server.
Our cryptographic building block is Authorized Private
Set Intersection (APSI) [9, 18, 17], hence, our Client/Server/
CA notation. We select one specific APSI construction in [17],
illustrated in Fig. 2, since it currently offers lowest commu-
nication and computation complexity. (Moreover, it can be
instantiated in the malicious model with only a small con-
stant additional overhead.) For efficiency reasons, Rc:i’s and
Rs are chosen uniformly at random from W =[1..⌊
√
N/2⌋],
rather than from ZN/2, as in the original version of the pro-
tocol. In fact, as proved in [33], the distribution of gx mod N
with x ← W is computationally indistinguishable from the
distribution defined by gx with x← [1..φ(N)]. This change
does not affect protocol security arguments. Thus, we do
not provide a new proof for APSI in this paper.
P3MT involves two phases: offline and an online.
During the offline phase:
1. CA generates RSA public-private keypair ((N, e), d),
publishes (N, e), and keeps d private.
2. Client prepares a fingerprint of drugD: fp(D)={(b∗j ||j)},
where each b∗j is expected at position j of a genome
suitable for D.
3. Client obtains from CA an authorization auth(fp(D)),
where auth(fp(D))={σj | σj=H(b∗j ||j)d mod N}.
4. Server runs the offline stage of the APSI protocol in
Fig. 2, on input, G = {(b1||1), . . . , (bn||n)}, and pub-
lishes resulting {ts1, . . . , tsn}.
During the online phase:
1. Client and Server run the online part of the APSI pro-
tocol in Fig. 2. Recall that Client’s input is (fp(D),
auth(fp(D))), and Server’s is G.
2. After the interaction, Client obtains fp(D) ∩ G, and
uses this information to determine whether Server is
well-suited for drug D.
We note that auth is needed to limit the scope of the test
on a patient DNA: the FDA can guarantee that: (i) fp only
covers the appropriate set of required nucleotides, and (ii)
pharmaceuticals cannot input arbitrary portions of a patient
genome.
The proposed P3MT protocol is resilient against (ran-
domly distributed) sequencing errors. The size of the finger-
print input by Client in the protocol is negligible compared
to the size of the entire genome. Thus, positions correspond-
ing to Client input are affected by errors with extremely low
probability.
Performance Evaluation. To estimate the efficiency of
the P3MT protocol, we consider two genetic tests commonly
performed in the context of personalized medicine: the anal-
ysis of hla-B and tpmt genes. Our choice is also motivated by
the size of their fingerprints that, according to genomics ex-
perts, is representative of most personalized medicine tests.
First, we look at the hla-B*5701 allelic variant, one G→T
mutation associated with extreme sensitivity to abacavir,
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Client, on input: (C, Cσ), where [Common input: (N, e, g,H,H′)] Server, on input: S = {s1, . . . , sw}
C = {c1, . . . , cv} and Cσ = {σ1, . . . , σv}
(∀i, σi = H(ci)d mod N)
Offline
{sˆ1, . . . , sˆw} ← Π(S), with Π
random permutation
Rs ←
[
1..⌊√N/2⌋
]
∀j 1 ≤ j ≤ w, ksj = H(sˆj)2Rs
∀j 1 ≤ j ≤ w, tsj = H′(ksj){ts1, . . . , tsw}
oo
Online
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, Rc:i ←
[
1..⌊√N/2⌋
]
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, ai = σi · gRc:i {a1, . . . , av} Online
// Y = g2eRs
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, a′i = (ai)2eRsY, {a′1, . . . , a′v}
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, tci = H′(a′i · Y −Rc:i) oo
Out: {ci|ci ∈ C and tci ∈ {ts1, .., tsw}}
Figure 2: APSI Protocol from [17] (simplified for semi-honest security). The protocol is run on common
input of RSA modulus N = pq (with p and q safe primes), public exponent e, a random element g in Z∗N and
two hash functions, H and H′, modeled as random oracles. All computation is mod N .
a drug used in HIV treatment [61]. In diploid organisms
(such as humans), mutation may occur in either chromo-
some inherited from the parents. Thus, the related finger-
print contains 2 (nucleotide, position) pairs. We also con-
sider the analysis of tpmt typically done before prescribing
6-mercaptopurine to leukemia patients. As shown in [85],
two alleles are known to cause the tpmt disorder: (1) one
presents a mutation G→C in position 238 of gene’s c-DNA,
(2) the other presents one mutation G→A in position 460
and one A→G in position 719.4 Therefore, the resulting
fingerprint contains these 6 (nucleotide, position) pairs.
In the underlying APSI protocol (Fig. 2), cryptographic
operations on Server genome do not depend on Client in-
put. Therefore, they can be computed offline, once for all
possible tests. Moreover, we have designed the P3MT pro-
tocol to be as generic as possible. Our protocol runs on the
whole Server’s genome — with linear complexity — in or-
der to address future scenarios where genomics advances will
cause better understanding of many more regions of human
genomes. To reduce offline costs, we apply reference-based
compression [14, 6] – a technique commonly used to effi-
ciently represent genomic information. In particular, Server
input consists of all differences between its genome and the
reference sequence. We emphasize that this technique does
not require any biological correctness of the reference ge-
nome that is only used for compression [42]. This allows us
to reduce the size of Server input to about 1% of the entire
genome.
Table 4 summarizes execution time and bandwidth costs
of the P3MT protocol used for testing hla-B and tpmt. These
costs cannot be meaningfully compared to prior work, since,
to the best of our knowledge, there is no other technique
targeting privacy-preserving personalized medicine testing.
Furthermore, as mentioned in Sec. 2, there are no current
techniques that enforce fingerprint authorization by a trusted
entity, such as the FDA. Also, prior work is essentially de-
signed for operation on DNA snippets, and it is unclear how
4
For more details on tpmt and c-DNA, refer to [63] and [56], respec-
tively.
Test Party
Offline Online
Time Time Size
hla-b*5701
Client – 0.82 ms 256 B
Server 206 mins 0.82 ms 4.14 GB
tpmt
Client – 2.46 ms 768 B
Server 206 mins 2.46 ms 4.14 GB
Table 4: Computation and communication costs of
P3MT protocol for hla-b (2-nucleotide fingerprint)
and tpmt (6-nucleotide fingerprint) tests.
to efficiently adapt it to full genomes. Although a detailed
experimental study is out of scope of this paper, we intend
to include it as part of future work.
4.3 Privacy-Preserving Genetic Compatibility
Testing
Genetic Compatibility Testing (GCT) can predict whether
potential partners are at risk of conceiving a child with a
recessive genetic disease. This occurs when both partners
carry at least one gene affected by mutation, i.e., they are
either asymptomatic carriers or actual disease sufferers. As
in the Beta-Thalassemia example discussed in Sec. 1, asymp-
tomatic carriers usually need to learn whether their potential
partner is also a carrier of the same disease, since this would
pose a serious risk to their potential off-spring.
To achieve genetic compatibility testing with privacy we
introduce the concept of Privacy-Preserving Genetic
Compatibility Testing (PPGCT) that allows participants
to run GCT without disclosing to each other: (1) any other
genomic information, and (2) which disease(s) they are car-
rying or being tested for.
Current biological knowledge of the human genome allows
screening for a genetic disease associated with one SNP in
a specific gene. In other words, most well-characterized ge-
netic diseases are caused by a mutation in a single gene.
However, we anticipate that, in the near future, researchers
will develop tests for more complex diseases (e.g., diabetes
or hypertension) involving multiple genes and multiple mu-
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Client, on input C = {c1, . . . , cv} [Common Input: (p, q, g,H,H′)] Server, on input S = {s1, . . . , sw}
Offline
{sˆ1, . . . , sˆw} ← Π(S), with Π
random permutation
Rs ← Zq
∀j 1 ≤ j ≤ w, tsj = H′(H(sˆj)Rs){ts1, . . . , tsw}
oo
Online
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, Rc:i ← Zq {a1, . . . , av} Online
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, ai = H(ci)Rc:i // ∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, a′i = (ai)Rs
{a′1, . . . , a′v}
oo∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, tci = H′((a′i)1/Rc:i )
Out: {ci|ci ∈ C and tci ∈ {ts1, .., tsw}}
Figure 3: PSI Protocol from [44] (simplified for semi-honest security). It runs on common input of two
primes p and q (s.t. q|p− 1), a generator g of a subgroup of size q and two hash functions, H and H′, modeled
as random oracles. All computation is mod p.
tations. Therefore, we aim to design PPGCT techniques
not limited to single-mutation diseases. Additional motivat-
ing examples for PPGCT include compatibility testing for
sperm and organ donors.
The proposed PPGCT protocol involves two participants:
Client and Server. Client runs on input of a fingerprint of a
genetic disease Dˆ. Server runs on input of its fully-sequenced
genome G. At the end of the interaction, Client learns the
output of the test, i.e., whether Server carries disease Dˆ.
Our cryptographic building block is Private Set Intersec-
tion (PSI) [18, 27, 44, 17]. We select the specific PSI con-
struction in [44], shown in Fig. 4, since it achieves the best
communication and computation complexity. It can also be
instantiated in the malicious model with only a small con-
stant additional overhead.
The PPGCT protocol involves the following steps:
1. Client builds a fingerprint corresponding to her genetic
diseases fp(Dˆ)={(b∗j ||j)}, where each b∗j is expected at
position j of a genome with disease Dˆ.
2. Client and Server run the PSI protocol in Fig. 4 on
respective inputs: fp(Dˆ) and G.
3. Client obtains fp(Dˆ) ∩ G, and uses this information to
determine whether Server carries disease Dˆ.
The change from PSI-CA to PSI is motivated as follows.
Depending on the disease being tested, a positive outcome
occurs if the genome contains either: (1) the entire dis-
ease fingerprint, or (2) a given subset of nucleotides. In
case of (1), the test result is positive only if: fp(Dˆ) ⊂
G, i.e., fp(Dˆ)∩ G=fp(Dˆ): if this happens, there is actually
no difference between the output of PSI and that of PSI-CA.
However, PSI-CA is preferred over PSI since, if the test is
negative, less information about Server genome is revealed
to Client. In case of (2), cardinality of set intersection is in-
sufficient to assess the test result, since Client needs to learn
which fingerprint nucleotides appear in Server’s genome.
Similar to its P3MT counterpart, the PPGCT protocol is
resilient to uniformly distributed errors. In particular, since
input size of Client is small, corresponding positions in Server
genome are affected by errors with very low probability.
Open Problem: Unfortunately, a malicious Client could
potentially harvest Server’s genetic information (in addition
to that needed for the compatibility test) by inflating its
input. For instance, a healthy Client could learn whether or
not Server carries a given genetic disease, unrelated to the
compatibility testing.
Performance. As concrete examples, we use genetic com-
patibility tests for two genetic disorders: Roberts syndrome
and Beta-Thalassemia. We chose them since they are fairly
common and the size of their fingerprints is representative
of that in most genetic compatibility tests.
Similar to P3MT, we stress that cryptographic operations
performed on Server genome, in the underlying PSI protocol,
do not depend on Client input. Therefore, these operations
can be pre-computed (just once) ahead of time.
First, we consider testing for Roberts syndrome. an au-
tosomal genetic disorder, characterized by pre- and post-
natal growth deficiency, limb malformations, and distinc-
tive skull and facial abnormalities. As shown in [35], there
are 26 single point mutations (in the esco2 gene) causing
this syndrome. Since humans are diploid organisms, we
expect Roberts syndrome fingerprint to contain about 52
(nucleotide, location) pairs.
Next, we turn to Beta-Thalassemia. As pointed out in
[28], more than 250 mutations in the hbb gene have been
found to cause this disorder and most of them involve a
change in a single nucleotide. Although reliable techniques
to perform this test in silico are not yet available, it is rea-
sonable to assume that the size of the Beta-Thalassemia fin-
gerprint would include 2×250 = 500 (nucleotide, location)
pairs.
Table 5 summarizes run time (computational) and band-
width requirements for the PPGCT protocol for Roberts
syndrome and Beta-Thalassemia, respectively. Following
the same arguments as in P3MT experiments, we let Server
input the portion of its genome that differs from the refer-
ence genome, i.e., about 1%.
Performance of the PPGCT protocol cannot be meaning-
fully compared to prior work. As discussed in Sec. 2, it is
not trivial to adapt current secure pattern matching tech-
niques to genetic compatibility testing on fully sequenced
genomes. An experimental study (including the adaptation
of such techniques) is left for future work.
5. SECURITY DISCUSSION
We now discuss security properties of protocols presented
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Client, on input C = {c1, . . . , cv} [Common Input: (p, q, g,H,H′)] Server, on input S = {s1, . . . , sw}
Offline
{sˆ1, . . . , sˆw} ← Π(S), with Π
random permutation
Rs ← Zq
∀j 1 ≤ j ≤ w, tsj = H′(H(sˆj)Rs){ts1, . . . , tsw}
oo
Online
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, Rc:i ← Zq {a1, . . . , av} Online
∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, ai = H(ci)Rc:i // ∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, a′i = (ai)Rs
{a′1, . . . , a′v}
oo∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ v, tci = H′((a′i)1/Rc:i )
Out: {ci|ci ∈ C and tci ∈ {ts1, .., tsw}}
Figure 4: PSI Protocol from [44] (simplified for semi-honest security). It runs on common input of two
primes p and q (s.t. q|p− 1), a generator g of a subgroup of size q and two hash functions, H and H′, modeled
as random oracles. All computation is mod p.
Test Party
Offline Online
Time Time Size
Roberts syndrome
Client – 7.26 ms 62.5 KB
Server 67 mins 7.26 ms 4.14 GB
Beta-Thalassemia
Client – 70 ms 6.5 KB
Server 67 mins 70 ms 4.14 GB
Table 5: Computation and communication costs of
the PPGCT protocol for Beta-Thalassemia (500-
nucleotide fingerprint) and Roberts syndrome (52-
nucleotide fingerprint) tests.
in this paper. In general, security of each protocol is based
on that of the underlying building blocks. Therefore, we
omit proof details to ease presentation. Also, out crypto-
graphic building blocks (PSI-CA, APSI, and PSI) can be
generally used in a black-box manner. One can select any
instantiation without affecting security of our protocols, as
long as the chosen construction yields secure PSI/APSI/PSI-
CA functionality. However, we pick specific instantiations to
maximize protocol efficiency. As discussed earlier, we con-
sider semi-honest adversaries (participants). Nevertheless,
we are not restricted to this model, since our cryptographic
building blocks are (provably) adaptable to the malicious
participant model, incurring a small constant extra over-
head.
PPGPT. We now show that RFLP-based PPGPT proto-
col (Sec. 4.1) is secure against semi-honest adversaries. We
assume that PSI-CA performs secure computation of the
FPSI-CA functionality, in the presence of semi-honest partic-
ipants. We select the construction in [19], that is secure
under the One-More-DH assumption in the Random Oracle
Model (ROM).
We divide the protocol in two phases. In the first, both
Client and Server privately and independently perform the
RFLP-related computation on their respective inputs. (This
covers steps 1 to 3 of PPGPT). At the end of this phase,
Client and Server construct sets FC and FS , respectively.
Clearly, during this phase, neither participant learns any-
thing about the other’s input. During the second phase
(steps 4-5), participants use FC and FS as their respective
inputs to PSI-CA. Given the security of the latter, Client
only learns |FS ∩ FC |. PSI-CA protocols may reveal |FS | to
Client and |FC | to Server. However, |FS |= |FC |= l, which is
already known to both parties.
P3MT. Similarly, security of the P3MT protocol (in Sec. 4.2),
against semi-honest Client and Server, stems from security of
the underlying protocol — APSI. That is, if APSI performs
secure computation of the FAPSI functionality in the presence
of semi-honest participants, then P3MT is also secure. This
holds since a semi-honest participant with a non-negligible
advantage in distinguishing between real and simulated ex-
ecutions of P3MT would have the same advantage in dis-
tinguishing between real and simulated executions of APSI.
Although one can use APSI as a black box, for efficiency rea-
sons, we prefer instantiations that allow pre-computation on
Server input. In our instantiation, we select the APSI con-
struction in [17], proven secure under the RSA and DDH
assumptions (in ROM).
PPGCT. Finally, security of the PPGCT protocol (Sec. 4.3)
against semi-honest adversaries relies on that of the under-
lying PSI protocol, to which it is immediately reducible. (In
other words, a semi-honest participant with a non-negligible
advantage in distinguishing between real and simulated ex-
ecutions of PPGCT would have the same advantage in dis-
tinguishing between real and simulated executions of PSI.)
Again, although one can use PSI as a black box, for effi-
ciency reasons, we need PSI instantiations that allow pre-
computation on Server input, such as OPRF-based constructs
[37, 18, 17, 44]. We chose the PSI from [44], proven secure
under the One-More-DH assumption (in ROM).
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper identified and explored three popular privacy-
sensitive genomic applications: (i) paternity tests, (ii) per-
sonalized medicine and (iii) genetic compatibility testing.
Unlike most previous work, we focused on fully sequenced
genomes. This scenario poses new challenges, both in terms
of privacy and computational cost. For each application,
we proposed an efficient construction, based on well-known
cryptographic tools: Private Set Intersection (PSI), Private
Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA), and Authorized Pri-
vate Set Intersection (APSI). Experiments show that these
protocols incur online overhead sufficiently low to be practi-
cal today. In particular, our protocol for privacy-preserving
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paternity testing is significantly less expensive — in both
computation and communication — than prior work. Fur-
thermore, all protocols presented in this paper have been
carefully constructed to mimic the state-of-the-art of (in
vitro) biological tests currently performed in hospitals and
laboratories.
Items for future work include, but are not limited to:
• Introducing privacy-preserving genetic paternity test-
ing based on STR and/or SNP comparison.
• Exploring privacy-preserving techniques to realize ge-
netic ancestry testing, i.e., to discover whether or not
individuals are related up to a certain degree (e.g., see
http://23andme.com.)
• Exploring probabilistic privacy-preserving genetic pa-
ternity and ancestry testing based on MinHash tech-
niques, as discussed in [5].
• Extending the paternity test protocol to allow both
participants to determine whether the other party in-
troduced correct input according to some auxiliary au-
thorization. (Note that APSI does not suffice since one
of the parties might alter its input so that the test is
negative).
• Investigation of additional privacy-sensitive applica-
tions for fully-sequenced genomes, such as certified
forensic identification, where the subject of investiga-
tion must prove the authenticity of its input; privacy-
preserving organ recipients compatibility, where a sub-
ject efficiently identifies a matching sample without re-
vealing information about her genome.
• Extending our experiments to include adaptation of
secure pattern matching and text processing to per-
sonalized medicine and genetic compatibility testing
on full genomes.
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